

# The Anatomy of Arminianism

Or,

The Opening of the Controversies of these times  
(formerly handled in the Low-Countries) concerning the  
Doctrine of Providence, of Predestination, of the Death of  
Christ, of Nature and Grace, etc.

## Chapter 13: Of the Object of Predestination

by Peter du Moulin, Minister of the Church at Paris

*There are certain men crept in which were before ordained to this condemnation (Jude 4).*



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Set up in a more readable format for the 21<sup>st</sup> century student  
by Nathan Clay Brummel, 2022

# Chapter 13: Of the Object of Predestination

Pierre du Moulin

*Of the Object of Predestination, that is, whether God predestinating, considers a man as fallen, or as not fallen.*

Although God has elected to salvation, these men rather than others, for no other cause, than that it so seemed good to him, nor is the cause of this difference to be found in man; yet what is the object of Predestination, that is, whether God electing or reprobating men, has considered them as fallen and sinners, or as not fallen, but as men in the mass, not corrupted, it may be doubted. The pastors of the Valacrian churches, strong maintainers of the truth, in their most exact epistle, a copy of which they have sent to us, do profess that they think that God considered those men which he did elect, and which he passed by, as fallen in Adam, and dead in sins. All the ancient think so, to none of whom (as far I know) it ever came in their minds to say that God reprobated men without the beholding of sin. I see that of the same opinion is Calvin, Zanchy, Melancthon, Bucer, Musculus, Pareus, famous lights in this age of the church, out of whose writings I have added some gathered sentences at the end of this work, lest they should stay the hastening reader, and should break of the threat of the disputation begun against the Arminians. The confession of the churches of France does keep itself within these limits in the twelfth article, where out of the ninth chapter to the Romans, and other places of

Scripture, Election and Reprobation is proved to be out of the corrupt mass. The reverend Synod of Dordt (then which for many ages there hath been none more famous, nor more holy) hath allowed this opinion: I do not see what can be opposed to so great authority. A holy assembly gathered together out of divers parts of the Christian world has prudently seen and discerned that this opinion is not only more modest, and more safe, but also that it is most fit to put back the objections of these innovators, who impudently triumph in this matter: Thus are their frames dissolved, and their sinews are cut from them; for Reprobation without the beholding of sins being taken away, which they assail with all their forces, they beat the air, neither have they anything that they should strike at: the causes by which our confession, and also the reverend Synod is led, that they thought it fit for them to rest in the Predestination, wherein man is considered as fallen, I suppose to be these:

First, that phrase of Scripture which calls the elect “the vessels of mercy” offers itself. Now there is no place for mercy unless towards the miserable. He cannot be elected to the salvation to be obtained by Christ unless he be considered as one who needs a redeemer. And seeing that the appointment to an end includes the means by which that end is come by, and the means to salvation is the remission of sins, nor is there remission of sins without sin, it is plain that they are appointed to salvation who are considered as sinners.

Neither could God, with the preservation of his justice, punish those men whom he considered without sin, for God does not punish the guiltless. Damnation is an act of the justice of God, which justice cannot stand, or agree with itself, if innocent men for no fault be appointed to that desertion, and forsaking, which eternal destruction must necessarily follow; or if God had determined to destroy men, before he did determine to create them.

Then as God does not condemn unless it be for sin, so it is certain that he is not willing to condemn, unless it be for sin. But to reprobate men, and to be willing

to condemn, are the same thing, even as to elect and to be willing to save, is the same thing: Therefore God does not reprobate unless it be for sin.

Furthermore it cannot be denied, but that reprobation or rejection of the creature from God, is the great punishment which can be inflicted on the reasonable creature, because eternal torments necessarily follow it, which if we get to be granted; it will thence follow, that it is not the part of infinite goodness and highest justice to forsake his own creature, and that not because he has sinned, but because it so seemed good to God, that he might seek matter for his glory out of the desertion, and forsaking of the soul which he created. Can the father who knows that the happiness of his son depends on him, without the crime of cruelty, and want of natural affection, forsake his son that is innocent, and found guilty of no wickedness, especially if by this forsaking, his son should fall into eternal torments, and by it be made not only most miserable, but also most wicked?

Neither should God deal justly, if he should give more evil to the creature, by infinite past, than he has given good: To which, when he had given "*esse*," a being, a while after, without any fault of it, he gave it an evil "*esse*," an evil and miserable being forever. Indeed if God should only take away what he has given, and should bring the creature to nothing, there were no cause at all of complaining: But to give an infinite evil to that creature, to whom he gave a finite good, and to create man to that end only that he might destroy him, that out of this destruction he might get glory to himself, the goodness and justice of God abhors.

Yet this is the most grievous thing, that by this, either reprobation or desertion of man, being considered without sin, the innocent is made not only more miserable, but even most wicked: For the aversion and turning away of the will, necessarily follows the denying of the Spirit of God; and seeing according to this opinion, God hated man, that was made by him, before man hated God, it cannot come to pass, but that the hatred of God, whereby he hates man, by the same opinion, should be

made the cause of that hatred whereby man hates God, and so God should be made the author of sin.

And if God hated Esau, being considered in the uncorruptible mass, as not a sinner, it must needs be, that God hates the innocent creature; and hatred in God, although it is not an human affection, nor a perturbation, yet it is a sure and certain will of punishing, and punishment cannot be just, if it be without offence; neither can a man be justly punished, unless he be considered as a sinner.

If any man should say that God is obnoxious, or subject to no laws, and therefore his actions are not rightly examined, according to the rule of justice, seeing he is tied to no rules: I will answer that the nature of God is more mighty than any law: That natural perfection by which it is impossible that God should lie or that he should sin; is also the cause why he could not hate his guiltless creature, or appoint man to eternal torments, for no fault of his: yea if these things were true, it were the part of a wiseman to suppress these things, not to move this anagyris<sup>1</sup> or offensive matter, and rather to command silence or ignorance to themselves, than to break into these secrets, which being declared, do cast in scruples and doubts, and yield occasion to the adversaries of defaming the true religion, and by which no man is made fitter to the duties of a Christian, or of a civil man, or to any part of piety.

He could not escape who should say, that by reprobation men are not appointed to damnation, but only are passed by, or not elected. Thus they seek gentler words, that by them the same thing might be said; for it is all one, whether God appoints a man to damnation, or does that, from which damnation must necessarily follow. Whosoever God does not elect, whether he is said to be omitted and passed by, or to be reprobated, he is always excluded from the grace of God, damnation certainly follows this excluding; because without the grace of election there is no salvation. For seeing it is manifest to all, that men by election are

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<sup>1</sup> Small shrub

appointed to salvation, I would have it told me, to what they are not elected, but passed by, are appointed: Surely if election appoints men to salvation it is plain, that by reprobation, which is called omission or passing by, the rest are excluded from salvation and appointed to destruction.

And if God has appointed the innocent creature to destruction, it must needs be, that he has appointed it to sin, without which, there can be no just destruction, and so God would be the impulsive and moving cause for that sin, to which he is either precisely appointed, or compelled by the will of God.

That the decrees of God are eternal, and that he has fore-known all things from eternity, does not hinder this opinion, which maintains God in election and reprobation, to have considered man as fallen, before he considered him as condemned: For although the decrees of God are certain, yet there is some order among them; as the eternal decree of overthrowing the world by fire, was in order after the decree of creating the world: So although God, from eternity, had appointed the wicked to punishment, yet nothing hinders but that the consideration, whereby he considered men as sinners, should be in order before that whereby he considered men as reprobate, or appointed to punishment.

Neither does it follow of the opinion of the reverend Synod, and the confession of our churches, by which man fallen is the object of predestination, that God created man to an uncertain end, or to have missed of that end which he propounded to himself. The last end, propounded to God, was the illustration, and setting forth of his glory, by the manifestation of his goodness and justice; that he might come to this end, he decreed to create man just, but mutable and free: The foreknowledge of the fall of man follows this decree, not in time, but in order, and election and reprobation follows in order this foreknowledge.

They are very far from the truth who would have God, in electing and reprobating, to have considered man as not created; for they do as much as if they should say, that God considered man as nothing, and therefore as not man. Surely in

that very thing, that they call him a man, they call him somewhat; but to consider something as nothing is a thing well-nigh a dream: He that will save or punish a man must necessarily first have willed him to be a man: For if God had appointed man to punishment before he had appointed to create him, he should so do, as if anyone should determine to beat his children, before he has determined to beget them.

Finally, seeing the first act of his omnipotence was busied about nothing, it must needs be that it went before the act of his mercy or justice, which cannot be busied but about something that has being.

They say the same thing in other words, which would have God in predestinating to have considered man, as one that might be created and might fall: For he who says he might be created, says he was not yet created; and he who says he might fall, says that he had not fallen, but that to other inconveniences they add this increase, that they put a power and potential faculty in that thing which is nothing. In God indeed there was the active power of creating the world before he created it: But there was not in the world the passive power for creating, before it was created: So neither could there be power for the creation, or for the fall, in man being not created, and it is plainly contrary to reason, that of him who is not, it should be said that he may fall. Then also if God elected man that he might be created, what hinders that it may not be said, that he elected some whom he never would create? For these also may be created; but if God elected those whom he presupposed he would create, the will of creating must needs go before the election.